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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the institutionalisation of the Welfare 
State and its legitimacy, that is, until what extent the way of organising welfare programs have an impact on 
citizen’s perceptions of these programs and, hence, on the size and composition of the legitimacy basis of 
the Welfare State. In order to comply with this objective the paper is organised as follows: ?rst we will present 
data showing the cross-country variation in support for three main welfare programs (health care, old-age pen-
sions, unemployment bene?ts); then we will analyse until what extent high levels of legitimacy are achieved 
through cross-class coalitions or cross-ideology coalitions. Finally we evaluate the impact of different program 
characteristics on the aggregate level of popular support each program achieves. 
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RESUMEN
El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la relación entre la institucionalización del Estado del Bien-
estar y su legitimidad, es decir, hasta qué punto la forma de organizar el Estado de Bienestar afecta a las 
percepciones que los ciudadanos desarrollan sobre el mismo y, de esta manera, modi?ca el tamaño y compo-
sición de sus bases de apoyo. A ?n de cumplir con este objetivo el artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma: 
en primer lugar presentamos un panorama de la variación internacional en las actitudes hacia tres programas 
de bienestar (sanidad, pensiones y desempleo). Seguidamente estudiaremos de dónde proviene el apoyo 
extra que algunos programas consiguen, centrándonos especí?camente en comprobar si se logra una mayor 
legitimidad mediante la construcción de consensos inter-clases o inter-ideologías. Terminaremos evaluando 
qué características organizativas concretas son las que correlacionan con el nivel de apoyo popular que un 
programa recibe.
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INTRODUCTION
The ?rst studies on citizens’ attitudes toward the Welfare State (WS) started some 30 
years ago. In this time, public and academic interest on the topic has grown steadily. One 
of the reasons behind the success of this research area may have to do with the crucial 
role played by public opinion during the “crisis of the WS” which occurred in the 1990s. 
Although many economic think-tanks forecast grim futures for the WS, most WS’s rea-
ched the new millennium with the majority of their pieces still intact. Scholars such as 
Ramesh Mishra (1996) and Peter Taylor-Gooby (2003) have explained this surprising 
resilience by pointing to public opinion polls, which throughout this decade, have shown 
politicians that the electoral cost of reducing the WS could potentially be too high. 
  Legitimacy is important for the survival of any democratic institution, but this is espe-
cially true for the WS. Due to its sizeable effect on inequalities and on employer/emplo-
yee equilibriums, this institution has lived under permanent cross-?re since its birth.  More 
often than not, legitimacy comes into play as a force that restrains or initiates change. We 
have now reached a point in history in which almost every actor in the social policy arena 
is concerned with the legitimacy of public policies. However, it remains unclear what 
course of action could be taken to shape popular attitudes. For instance, can the govern-
ment act in a way that increases (or decreases) the legitimacy basis of the WS? It has 
been demonstrated that public opinion has a strong impact on the WS, but is it possible 
that the WS also shapes public opinion? Furthermore, is there a way to organize welfare 
programs that increases popular support for the WS?   
 This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by analyzing various mecha-
nisms behind welfare state legitimacy from a neo-institutionalist perspective. Our aim is 
to analyze the relationship between the institutionalization of the WS and its legitimacy. In 
other words, we seek to understand how the organization of welfare programs in?uences 
citizen perceptions of such programs. 
 In order to comply with this objective, the paper is organized in the following manner. 
The ?rst two sections contain the theoretical framework, hypotheses, and methods. We 
then present the data analysis which starts with a comparison of citizen’s attitudes toward 
welfare programs across eleven countries to determine where they achieve more popular 
support. Once this “legitimacy” ranking is developed and veri?ed, we proceed to study 
the composition of support for welfare programs in each individual country. Speci?cally, 
we analyze to what extent high levels of legitimacy are achieved through cross-class 
coalitions, through cross-ideology coalitions, or both. Finally, we evaluate the impact of 
different characteristics of welfare programs on their aggregate level of support.
 * This research has been developed in the framework of the cooperative project “Welfare Attitudes in a 
Changing Europe”, supported by the European Science Foundation and the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation
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THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND HYPOTHESES
A large share of studies on welfare attitudes have attempted to understand variations 
in support for the WS, at both the micro-level (among individuals) and the macro-level 
(among countries). At the micro-level, different studies established that attitudes to the 
WS have two general determinants:  “self-interest” and “ideology” (Svallfors, 1997, 2000; 
Forma, 1999; Andre? ? Heien, 2001; Lipsmeyer ? Nordstrom, 2003; Fraile ? Ferrer, 
2004). Self-interest refers to the economic interest an individual has in the existence of 
welfare programs. Analyses performed in almost all OECD countries show that, on the 
whole, low income groups and those more dependent on public programs for the provi-
sion of welfare services are more prone to support the WS than are high income groups 
and those with less risk of welfare dependency. 
 The second determinant, ideology, has to do with moral values, particularly values 
related to economic distribution such as economic justice beliefs and egalitarianism vs. 
individualism. Ideological self-placement (1-10) and attitudes toward redistribution are 
the variables most commonly used in the literature as proxies for egalitarianism. It has 
been empirically demonstrated in almost all countries that citizens who de?ne themsel-
ves as leftist, and those who are positive to redistribution, are more prone to support 
the WS than are their counterparts. Although egalitarianism and economic position are 
related, both factors work independently from each other, (i.e.independently of income, 
left-wing people are more likely to support welfare policies than right-wing people.)  
 These general determinants are one of the main ?ndings of micro-level studies. How-
ever, a great deal of effort has also been made to study these attitudes at the macro-level. 
Comparative studies contend that the legitimacy of the WS varies across countries 
(Ferrera, 1993). Several authors have tried to explain this fact through country variables 
such as the degree of industrialization (Evans, 1995), level of inequality (Forma, 1999), 
organization of the political system (Haller et al., 1990), economic traditions (Bonoli, 
2000), political trust (Svallfors, 2002), national values (Giddens, 2000), and the historical 
roots of social institutions (Lin, 2005). None of these avenues has been successful. 
 The most recent path of research on the topic is founded in neo-institutionalism 
(North, 1999; Pierson, 1993). This research suggests a simple yet appealing explana-
tion: the diverging levels of popular support for welfare programs could be due to the fact 
that these programs are organized in very different ways across countries. Most studies 
attempt to test this idea using Esping-Andersen’s typology of WS’s to seek a relation-
ship between the country’s welfare regime and the level of support for its main welfare 
programs. The results are contradictory: some authors ?nd a relationship between wel-
fare regimes and WS legitimacy (Gundelach, 1994; Gevers et.al, 2000; Andre? ? Heien, 
2001), others deny it exists (Bean ? Papadakis, 1998; Bonoli, 2000), and others think 
that it may exist but with important outliers (Svallfors, 2000). 
 The main problem of these studies is that they seek to explain attitudes towards par-
ticular programs through a presumably all-inclusive independent variable such as welfare 
regime. Citizens’ opinions can be in?uenced by how welfare programs are organized 
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but, if this is so, we need to determine what speci?c characteristics are in?uential, and 
through what mechanisms they are translated to people’s attitudes. To do this, the work 
of some longstanding and recent social policy experts is helpful.  
 One of the founding fathers of comparative welfare studies, Richard Titmuss, 
re?ected 50 years ago on the risks involved by private or occupational welfare schemes. 
He explained that:
 As they grow and multiply they come into con?icts with the aims and unity of social policy; 
for in effect (whatever their aims may be) their whole tendency at present is to divide 
loyalties, to nourish privilege, and to narrow social conscience as they have already 
done in the United States, in France and in Western Germany (Titmuss, 1955:164).
 Some 40 years later, Titmuss’ insight was retrieved by three prominent scholars of 
comparative welfare states. Walter Korpi (1998) ? Joakim Palme (1998), and Esping-
Andersen (2000) theorized on the relationship between a welfare program’s degree of 
integration and its popular legitimacy. They asserted that integration is one the character-
istics of a welfare program that strongly in?uences citizens’ opinions. 
 For these authors, integration is not de?ned as legal access to welfare programs, 
but as the “real” use of those programs. For instance, how many people actually depend 
on public welfare programs for the provision of healthcare, education, or to maintain a 
good standard of living when they are old or unemployed? To be integrative, a program 
must be universally accessible and provide a level of bene?ts and services which match 
the expectations of the middle and upper-middle classes. Integration means that public 
welfare programs are used as a main source of provision not only by lower classes (that 
have no other option), but also by groups who could opt out of the system. In Korpi’s 
words: 
 The encompassing1 model includes all citizens in the same programs. By giving basic 
security to everybody and offering clearly earning-related bene?ts to all economically 
active individuals, in contrast to the targeted and basic security models, the encompas-
sing model brings low-income groups and the better-off citizens into the same institutio-
nal structures. Because of its earning-related bene?ts, it is likely to reduce the demand 
for private insurance. Thus, the encompassing model can be expected to have the most 
favourable outcomes in terms of the formation of class coalitions that include manual 
workers as well as the middle classes ( Korpi 1998:672)
 From this quotation, it is clear that the hypothetical mechanism that links a welfare 
program’s degree of integration with its popular legitimacy is related to the generation of 
 1 In Korpi’s typology (1998), welfare states with a high degree of integration are included in the 
Encompassing Model.
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cross-class coalitions in support of the program. In this paper we aim to ?nd empirical 
support for this idea. As such, our hypotheses are elaborated below. If highly integrative 
welfare programs achieve a higher legitimacy than other programs because they gene-
rate cross-class coalitions of support, then our data should show that: 
 H1. International variation in support for welfare programs is statistically signi?cant 
and partially due to some country-level variable.
   
 H.2. There is a relationship between the level of legitimacy of welfare programs and 
the composition of their support basis. Assuming that the lower classes will always sup-
port the WS because of their almost total dependency on public provision, this hypothesis 
implies that some countries have pushed middle and upper-middle class support for the 
WS to levels close to those typical of the lower classes.
 H.3. There is a relationship between the level of integration of a program and its 
legitimacy (aggregate support). Programs that integrate the middle and upper-middle 
classes will achieve higher legitimacy than those used mainly by the lower sectors of the 
population.
 Hypotheses 1 to 3 present an interesting model to explain international variation in 
support for the WS.  However, these hypotheses are entirely focused on only one of the 
two determinants of attitudes to the WS: self-interest. Since we know that ideology is of 
enormous importance in understanding what people think of welfare policies, we have 
built an alternative (or complementary) hypothesis: 
 
 H.2.b. Some countries present higher levels of support for the WS because they 
have managed to build an inter-ideology consensus regarding the WS. This implies that 
in some countries people who hold individualistic values support the WS as much (or 
nearly as much) as those embracing egalitarian values. In other words, high legitimacy is 
achieved when the WS loses, in the eyes of citizens, the ideological or moral purpose of 
helping the poor and building a more egalitarian society. 
DATA AND METHODS
a) Selection of countries
The following criteria were used in the selection of sample countries:  a) maximum varia-
tion in welfare organization; b) the inclusion of extreme cases regarding one or both of 
the phenomena to be studied (either attitudes to the WS or organizational characteristics 
of their welfare programs); and c) data availability. To comply with these criteria, we 
selected at least two countries from each of the now widely accepted welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990): Sweden and Norway (Social-democrat); France and Germany 
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(Corporatist); UK, USA, Australia, Ireland (Liberal), plus Canada as a heterogeneous 
WS; and Spain and Italy as representative of the Mediterranean regime (Bonoli, 1997; 
Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2002).
b) Data sources and variables
The economic indicators of welfare programs included in the last section of the paper 
have been produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Apart from these indicators, all the data used throughout the analysis were 
drawn from a survey carried out by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
in 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 titled “The Role of Government.” This article is primarily 
based on data from the third wave of the survey.
Dependent variables
Of the questions included in the survey we have chosen three items: 
 
P. “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsi-
bility to:
Provide healthcare for the sick.
Provide a decent standard of living for the old.
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.” 
The response options were: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????
  Although these questions may seem very general, studies on the dimensions of 
welfare attitudes reveal these questions to be the best indicators of support for the 
WS. This result is based on factor analyses using dozens of questions related to the 
different aspects of the WS. The analyses determined that attitudes towards the WS 
have several dimensions: citizen opinions are not the same when we ask them about 
the scope, level of expenditure, or consequences of welfare policies. However, the 
same factor analyses indicate that there is also a single underlying factor that can be 
understood as general support or rejection of state intervention on welfare, called “wel-
farism”. All questions regarding welfare issues correlate with this baseline factor and 
the questions that correlate the most are those that we have chosen (Van Oorschot ? 
Meuleman, 2009).
Independent variables
In our analyses, we use both micro-level and macro-level independent variables. For 
micro-level independent variables, we use indicators of the two factors that deter-
mine attitudes to the WS: self-interest and ideology. Following other studies, we 
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selected a question on attitudes towards redistribution as a proxy for the ideology 
determinant: 
 What is your opinion on the following statement: “It is the responsibility of government 
to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with 
low incomes.” 
 The possible response options were:???????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 We also use normal procedures by employing the relative economic position of 
each individual as a proxy of “self-interest.” This measure was built by transforming 
the family income of each individual into percentages of the national median. The 
variable ranges from “-0.6” (family income equal or below 60? the national median) to 
“+0.6” (family income 60? or more above the national median). In addition to this, sex 
is included in all regression models as a control since we know that in most countries 
women are typically more positive towards the WS than are men. 
 We use two types of macro-level variables to explain popular support for welfare 
programs: a) variables that refer to characteristics of each particular program; and b) 
variables that refer to the organization of the complete welfare system. 
 The program-speci?c attributes whose effects on legitimacy will be tested are: a) 
degree of integration (how many people really use and depend on the program); b) 
extension or range of provisions of the program; and c) economic effort devoted to the 
program. 
 Because our hypotheses focus on the effect of integration on legitimacy, we 
already have detailed reasons for its inclusion. Regarding the other two attributes, 
we believe that extensive programs that cover a wider range of needs within its 
domain (e.g., healthcare systems that provide not only medical attention but also 
medicines) can deepen citizens’ loyalties and, hence, strengthen the program’s 
legitimacy.  Economic effort is measured as the share of GDP devoted to a program. It can 
be signi?cant either as an indicator of the importance given to a welfare program by national 
governments, or as a (poor) proxy for the quality of provisions. 
 We are further interested in the potential effects on legitimacy of characteristics 
of the welfare system. First of all, the overall cost of welfare systems is important to 
address simply because expensive welfare systems may depress public support for all 
programs. Secondly, the size of the WS must be examined because larger institutions 
may have greater effects on public attitudes.  A large WS implies, at least, the exis-
tence of many loyal bureaucrats as well as several channels to in?uence social per-
ceptions of “normality” (King, 1987; Gundelach, 1994; Pierson, 1993, Svallfors, 2000; 
Andre? ? Heien, 2001). 
 The OECD data used as a proxy for each of the ?ve macro-level factor are pre-
sented in table 1. 
RIS, VOL.70. Nº 1, ENERO-ABRIL, 39-75, 2012. ISSN: 0034-9712. DOI: 10.3989/ris.2010.02.11
???? INÉS CALZADA
STATISTICAL METHODS
Most of the analyses performed are based on multilevel linear regression models where 
individuals are units of Level 1 and countries are units of Level 2. To analyze the form 
of welfare consensus, models include three Level 1 variables: sex, relative economic 
position, and ideology and random slopes for relative economic position and ideology2. 
To determine which program’s characteristics correlate with legitimacy, we include the 
Level 2 variables listed in table 1. 
 Multilevel models are a useful tool to separate variance in attitudes to the WS into 
two components; variance attributed to individual characteristics; and variance attributed 
to country-level factors. However, our analysis includes a small number of countries, and 
the generalization of results to other nations should be made with caution. 
 2 As a veri?cation strategy we have also run ordinal logistic regression models with the countries included 
as dummy variables and the interaction coef?cients “country*ideology” and “country*relative economic posi-
tion”. Results were coherent with multilevel models and are not included here.
Table 1. 
Characteristics of welfare programs/systems that can affect legitimacy (OECD data)
Healthcare Old-age pensions
Unemployment 
protection
Integration
Legal coverage.
Expenditure on private 
health insurance as a 
percentage of total health 
expenditure.
Replacement rate of 
public old-age pensions 
for low, middle and high 
incomes 
Replacement rate of 
unemployment bene?ts 
(average of  3 
situations) 
Extension
Public expenditure on 
health as a percentage of 
total (public and private) 
expenditure on health
Expenditure on “Other 
services to old-age” 
(apart from cash 
transfers)  as a ? of GDP
Expenditure on “Active 
labor market policies” 
as a % of GDP
Intensity % GDP on public healthcare % GDP on old-age programs
% GDP on 
unemployment 
protection programs 
Cost of the WS Percentage of salary devoted to taxes and social contributions by low, middle and high income groups.
Size of the WS % GDP devoted to social expenditure.
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INTERNATIONAL VARIATION IN ATTITUDES TO THE WELFARE STATE
While it may be counter-productive to our argument, it is necessary to point out that one 
of the main trends one notices when analyzing comparative data on WS attitudes is that 
there is often a large and stable consensus (as opposed to a variation in attitudes) in sup-
port of state intervention in welfare. Graphs 1-3 present answers to three of the questions 
that are generally used as indicators of basic support for the existence of core welfare 
programs: healthcare, old-age pensions, and unemployment. These graphs are helpful 
in that they illustrate differences over time and cross-culturally as they include answers 
from ?ve separate countries. 
 The countries included in these graphs were selected exclusively for reasons of data 
availability.  Apart from being rich Western countries, they constitute a heterogeneous mix 
with regards to their welfare structure and recent economic and political developments. 
The heterogeneity of our sample makes the similarities in welfare attitudes even more 
interesting. As can be seen, support for state intervention to guarantee healthcare and 
old-age pensions is higher than 80% in all countries. This support has been consistent 
since 1985. In the case of state intervention to guarantee a decent standard of living for 
the unemployed, attitudinal variation is much more signi?cant, both among countries and 
across time. Although the majority of each country’s population is in favor of some public 
protection for the unemployed, we are speaking of percentages between 50 and 70%. 
 Interestingly, the extended and somewhat stable legitimacy of the WS is an unde-
niable fact. But Graphs 1-3, like so many others that one can ?nd on this topic, were 
made by collapsing response categories and may be slightly misleading regarding the 
international homogeneity of support for welfare policies. Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the 
disaggregated answers to questions on state responsibility in welfare for 19963.
 The tables for health care and pensions show that those who think that the 
government should not intervene (probably not + de?nitely not) account for a small mino-
rity in every country (0.8% in Spain and Norway to 11.7% in the USA for healthcare and 
0.8% in Ireland to 13.2% in the USA for pensions). Greater disparity is found among 
the pro-welfare groups, who can be strongly or mildly convinced of the virtues of state 
intervention. For example, in Italy, Ireland, Norway, Spain and the UK, more than 70% of 
the population believes that the government “de?nitely should” intervene in these areas. 
Others show mild support. For instance, in Australia, Germany and the USA, the majority 
of supporters chose the “probably should be the responsibility of government” option. 
Cross-country variation in attitudes towards programs that help the unemployed is larger. 
 3 The tables exclude respondents who chose “don’t know” or “no answer.” Since these percentages are 
extremely low in every country, this decision does not imply an important loss of information. When adding the 
missing cases, “don’t know” and “no answer”, the percentage in the question on health care ranges from 0.5% 
to 6.8% depending on the country, from 0.3% to 5.5% for old-age pensions, and from 2% to 10% regarding 
unemployment protection.  
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Graph 1. 
Support for health care programs
Graph 2.  
Support for public pension systems
Data source: ISSP “The Role of Government I, II, III, IV” (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006). The percentage in the Y 
axis is the sum of respondents answering “De?nitely should be the responsibility of government” and those 
who answered “Probably should be the responsibility of government”. 
Data source: ISSP “The Role of Government I, II, III, IV” (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006). The percentage in the Y 
axis is the sum of respondents answering “De?nitely should be the responsibility of government” and those 
who answered “Probably should be the responsibility of government”. 
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Table 2. 
Attitudes towards public health care programs
Should it be the responsibility of government to??
Provide health care for the sick Total
De?nitely 
should be
Probably 
should be
Probably 
should not be
De?nitely 
should not be
Country AUS 42.4% 51.7% 5.4% .4% 100.0%
D-W 50.6% 46.0% 2.9% .5% 100.0%
GB 82.0% 16.4% 1.2% .3% 100.0%
USA 38.5% 46.1% 11.7% 3.7% 100.0%
I 81.0% 17.6% 1.0% .4% 100.0%
IRL 74.3% 24.7% .8% .1% 100.0%
N 87.4% 11.8% .5% .3% 100.0%
S 71.1% 25.3% 2.5% 1.2% 100.0%
CDN 63.4% 31.9% 3.4% 1.3% 100.0%
E 80.9% 18.3% .7% .1% 100.0%
F 54.5% 34.7% 7.3% 3.5% 100.0%
Total 64.5% 31.2% 3.4% 1.0% 100.0%
Graph 3. 
????????????????????????????????????????
Data source: ISSP “The Role of Government I, II, III, IV” (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006). The percentage in the Y 
axis is the sum of respondents answering “De?nitely should be the responsibility of government” and those 
who answered “Probably should be the responsibility of government”. 
Source: ISSP, 1996.
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Table 3. 
Attitudes towards public old-age pension systems
Should it be the responsibility of government to??
Provide a decent standard of living for the old Total
De?nitely
should be
Probably 
should be
Probably 
should not be
De?nitely 
should not be
Country AUS 37.4% 56.7% 5.5% .4% 100.0%
D-W 47.9% 48.1% 3.6% .4% 100.0%
GB 71.0% 26.3% 2.3% .4% 100.0%
USA 38.4% 48.3% 9.9% 3.3% 100.0%
I 76.1% 21.9% 1.7% .3% 100.0%
IRL 76.6% 22.6% .5% .3% 100.0%
N 85.9% 13.2% .5% .4% 100.0%
S 69.2% 28.5% 1.5% .8% 100.0%
CDN 49.4% 41.8% 7.0% 1.7% 100.0%
E 79.6% 19.4% .9% .2% 100.0%
F 54.4% 39.3% 4.8% 1.6% 100.0%
Total 61.0% 34.7% 3.5% .8% 100.0%
Here we ?nd countries where signi?cant portions of the population are not in favor of this 
public policy (around 35% in Australia and Canada and 52% in the USA). 
 Tables are important because they contain the raw data and give us an accurate 
picture of the extent of variation. However, when using surveys, raw data is frequently a 
synonym of “too much data”. The excessive number of percentages becomes cumber-
some when looking for patterns or even when ordering the countries in terms of higher to 
lower popular support for the WS. 
 To simplify our data, we have computed a weighted mean of answers: (4 x % who 
chose “De?nitely should”) + (3 x % of “Probably should”) + (2 x % “Probably not”) + (1 
x % “De?nitely not”). This method is better than collapsing categories because it takes 
into account variation between “strong” and “mild” supporters. In addition, this approach 
provides us with an index of legitimacy that ranges from 100 to 400 and has a clear inter-
pretation: it takes the value of 100 if 100% of the population states that the government 
“de?nitely should not” be responsible for a welfare area, and takes the value of 400 when 
the opposite is true: 100% of the population thinks that a welfare area “de?nitely should 
be” the government’s responsibility.  Using this weighted mean makes it easier to order 
our eleven countries according to the legitimacy of their welfare programs.
Source: ISSP, 1996.
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Table 5 shows the ranking of countries regarding the legitimacy of welfare programs. 
Ordinal logistic regression models including the countries as a set of dummies con?rm 
that the order of countries is statistically signi?cant. 
 Regarding the importance of a country’s effect on welfare attitudes, multilevel models 
tell us that variation across countries accounts for 12% of the total variation in attitudes 
towards healthcare and old-age programs (M0 in tables 8, 9, 10). This cross-country 
variation also accounts for 16% of the variation in attitudes towards unemployment bene-
?ts. This is a signi?cant amount if we compare it with similar studies. Therefore, our ?rst 
hypothesis ?nds empirical support, but we are unable to move forward in our analysis 
without ?rst dealing with an alternative explanation.
 Previously, we mentioned that one of the conclusions reached by scholars who con-
duct comparative studies on welfare attitudes is that citizens vary in their support for 
welfare programs depending on their egalitarianism (the ideology factor) and their direct 
interest in the existence of welfare programs (self-interest factor). Because of this, it is 
possible that cross-country variation in support for the WS has nothing to do with the form 
Table 4. 
Attitudes towards unemployment protection systems
 Should it be the responsibility of government to…?
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed Total
De?nitely 
should be
Probably 
should be
Probably 
should not be
De?nitely 
should not be
Country AUS 8.9% 56.2% 30.3% 4.5% 100.0%
D-W 16.9% 63.5% 15.6% 4.0% 100.0%
GB 28.4% 49.4% 15.3% 7.0% 100.0%
USA 12.8% 34.9% 33.1% 19.2% 100.0%
I 30.8% 44.9% 15.2% 9.1% 100.0%
IRL 39.7% 51.9% 6.8% 1.5% 100.0%
N 40.8% 51.9% 6.3% 1.1% 100.0%
S 38.3% 52.2% 7.3% 2.2% 100.0%
CDN 16.6% 51.2% 23.6% 8.6% 100.0%
E 59.2% 34.6% 4.8% 1.3% 100.0%
F 36.2% 46.3% 12.2% 5.2% 100.0%
Total 30.2% 49.1% 15.5% 5.2% 100.0%
Source: ISSP, 1996.  AUS: Australia, D-W: Germany (West), GB: Great Britain, USA: United States;
I: Italy; IRL: Ireland, N: Norway, S: Sweden, CDN: Canada, E: Spain, F: France.
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of welfare programs and is instead caused by the different distribution of egalitarianism 
and poverty across countries. For example, countries where more citizens hold egalita-
rian values will present a higher overall support for the WS independently of how welfare 
programs are organized. In order to establish the validity of this alternative explanation, 
new multilevel models were built. The reference models in Tables 8, 9  and 10 include 
the ideology, relative economic position, and sex of the individuals. This reduces the 
variation attributed to country level, but it does not make it disappear.  In fact, if the eleven 
countries had the same economic distribution and the same percentages of individualists 
and egalitarians, international differences in attitudes towards welfare programs would be 
only 12% smaller for healthcare programs, 16% smaller for old-age pensions, and 25% 
smaller for unemployment bene?ts.
 In this section, we have demonstrated that welfare programs have varying degrees of 
legitimacy and that part of the explanation for that variation lies in some speci?c country 
characteristic. Our hypotheses maintain that this country characteristic is the degree of 
integration of welfare programs. Following Korpi, Palme and Esping-Andersen, integra-
tion is translated into high levels of popular support through the generation of class-
coalitions. Our own complementary hypothesis suggests that integration could impact 
legitimacy by creating cross-ideology coalitions. The next section is devoted to analyzing 
the extent to which these mechanisms actually work.
Table 5. 
Welfare programs legitimacy ranking
Table 5.a      Table 5.b           Table 5.c
 Healthcare Pensions Unemployment
Norway 386 Norway 385 Spain 352
Spain 380 Spain 378 Norway 332
UK 380 Ireland 376 Ireland 330
Italy 379 Italy 373 Sweden 326
Ireland 374 UK 371 France 310
Sweden 366 Sweden 366 UK 301
Canada 354 Germany* 344 Italy 296
Germany* 347 France 342 Germany* 293
France 337 Canada 336 Canada 273
Australia 336 Australia 331 Australia 270
USA 319 USA 322 USA 241
Average 360 Average 357 Average 302
Source: prepared by the author with ISSP 1996 data. * Only West Germany.
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HOW IS HIGH LEGITIMACY ACHIEVED?
a) Cross-class consensus and welfare programs legitimacy
Seeing that welfare programs have more supporters in some places causes one to ques-
tion where this “extra support” comes from. For instance, which groups support the WS 
in one country, but are not positive towards this institution in other countries? According 
to hypothesis 2.a, the behavior of middle and upper-middle classes determines whether 
or not a WS will have low or high legitimacy. A welfare program will achieve a high level 
of popular support when it manages to bring middle classes up to the level of support of 
low classes.   
 In order to put this hypothesis to test, we have built multilevel models with three indi-
vidual variables: ideology, relative economic position, and sex.  We also include random 
slopes to determine if the effect of relative economic position on attitudes differs across 
countries. Since we are controlling for ideology and sex, we compare the effect of eco-
nomic position on attitudes towards welfare programs across people from different coun-
tries, but of the same sex and similar ideology.
 The models are similar to simple linear regressions with interactions between country 
and relative economic position, but the multilevel technique has the advantage of calcula-
ting the correlation between the random slope and the constant. This coef?cient enables 
us to know whether certain countries achieve more support for welfare policies because 
they have managed to diminish the attitudinal gap between low income and middle-high 
income groups.
 The models tell us various things. First of all, the effect of economic position on atti-
tudes towards the WS varies across countries. In other words, the gap in level of support 
for welfare programs between those with low and high incomes differs in size depending 
on the country. Secondly, low income people are more similar across countries in their 
attitudes towards welfare programs than are high income people4. Low income people 
tend to support welfare programs independently of the country where they live, while the 
levels of support of high income people depend more on their country of residence. The 
larger heterogeneity of middle classes is consistent with the argument that these groups 
are key to achieving a highly legitimized WS. However, we must mention that even if low 
income groups are more homogeneous than high income groups at the international 
scale, levels of support among low income groups also vary across countries. Finally, 
the coef?cient for the correlation between the random slope and the constant indicates 
that the lower the importance of income to determine attitudes to a welfare program, the 
higher its aggregate level of popular support . However, the coef?cient is not statistically 
 4 To reach this conclusion we computed the same models for those with incomes equal or below 60% of 
the national median, on the national median, and 60% or more above the national median. The models are 
not shown here.
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Table 6. 
Multilevel models with level-1 independent variables and random 
slopes for the variable “relative economic position”
Fixed part:
Healthcare Coef. P>z Unemployment Coef. P>z Pensions Coef. P>z
Ec. Position .0585746 0.044 Ec. Position .1551287 0.000 Ec. Position .0913612 0.001
Sex -.0490185 0.000 Sex -.0691173 0.000 Sex -.0557016 0.000
Ideology .0981942 0.000 Ideology .1666801 0.000 Ideology .0937479 0.000
_cons 1.171907 0.000 _cons 1.588891 0.000 _cons 1.217702 0.000
Random part:
Healthcare Estimate [95% Conf. Interval]
Sd(ec.position) .0884743 .0525185 .1490465
Sd(_cons) .2027524 .1304178 .3152065
Corr(ec.postion,_cons) .7660552 .2349056 .9449145
Sd(Residual) .5566257 .5499629 .5633694
Unemployment Estimate [95% Conf. Interval]
Sd(ec.position) .055888 .0255026 .1224767
Sd(_cons) .2794458 .1798195 .4342685
Corr(ec.position,cons) .4125849 -.3796732 .8557164
Sd(Residual) .7152956 .7066233 .7240743
Pensions Estimate [95% Conf. Interval]
Sd(ec.position) .0828598 .0485381 .1414506
Sd(_cons) .198492 .1276681 .3086055
Corr(ec.position,cons) .5777371 -.0584887 .8802044
Sd(Residual) .5515997 .5450034 .5582758
For the 3 models: prob>chi2 = 0.0000.
Lrtest comparing with OLS regression: Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. Source: own elaboration.
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signi?cant, indicating that the relationship is weak. Although this relationship works for 
the eleven countries in our sample, it cannot be extrapolated to other countries. 
 Ultimately, the general conclusion is that although welfare programs with high levels 
of popular support tend to have a consensus which is less fractured by economic rea-
sons, this is not suf?cient to explain why they reach such high levels of legitimacy. This 
contradictory ?nding can be clari?ed by looking at Graph 4 on healthcare. Graphs A1 
and A2 on pensions and unemployment, respectively, can be found in Appendix 2. To 
understand the graphs, we only need to know that: 
 ? In the horizontal axis, we have the economic position of the individual (-.60 = family 
income 60% lower than the national median; 0 = family income equal to national median; 
+.60 = family income 60% higher than the national median).
 ? The vertical axis shows the answer to the question on the desirability of state inter-
vention in healthcare. It ranges from 1 —strongly agree to 4— strongly disagree (see the 
section on methodology). 
 ? The line shows variation in support for state intervention in healthcare as we move 
from the lowest to the highest income positions.  
 Keeping this information in mind, and looking at the graphs, we can see that although 
the effect of economic position on attitudes towards welfare programs varies across 
countries, the most important difference lies in the baseline level of support. In countries 
with highly supported welfare programs, the level of support is high across all income posi-
tions. We also ?nd differences between income groups in these countries, but they occur in 
addition to this high level of support. The opposite is also true: in countries where welfare 
programs have low legitimacy, support for the programs is low across all income positions. 
(e.g., Spaniards or Italians with high economic positions are more prone to support welfare 
programs than Australians or Germans with incomes below the poverty line). 
 The low legitimacy of some welfare programs is not due (or not primarily due) to 
the lack of support from middle and high incomes. This low legitimacy can instead 
be attributed to programs that do not achieve high levels of support even among low 
income groups. High legitimacy requires persuading middle and low classes. In light of 
our results, support among the low classes cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, the 
existence of cross-class similarities in welfare attitudes is not always re?ective of a highly 
legitimized Welfare State. 
b) Inter-ideology consensus and welfare program legitimacy
To test our second hypothesis, we built multilevel regressions similar to those in the 
preceding section but we now introduce a random slope for ideology instead of relative 
economic position. Since we are controlling for economic position and sex, our models 
compare the effect of ideology on attitudes towards welfare programs of people from 
different countries but of the same sex and similar economic position.
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The models presented in table 7 allow us to determine if the effect of ideology on attitudes 
towards welfare programs differs across countries and to what extent having a consen-
sus with small ideological fractures equals having high legitimacy. 
 Our results provide support for the argument that high legitimacy is built through 
cross-ideology consensus. First, the models show that the effect of ideology on attitu-
des towards welfare programs varies: the gap in level of support between egalitarians 
and individualists is much larger in some countries than in others. Second, it is also 
con?rmed that egalitarian people are more homogeneous across countries with respect 
to their attitudes towards the WS than are individualists. Speci?cally, people who hold 
egalitarian values tend to support the WS independently of the country where they live, 
while individualists appear to be more affected by their national context5. Finally, where 
 5 To reach this conclusion we computed the same models for the strongly egalitarian and strongly indi-
vidualistic. The models are not shown here.
Graph 4. 
Attitudes towards public healthcare and economic position 
(conditioned by sex and ideology)
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States,  i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, s: 
Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France. 
Source: own elaboration with ISSP 1996 data.
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Table 7. 
Multilevel models with level-1 independent variables
 and random slopes for “ideology”
Fixed part:
Healthcare Coef. P>z Pensions Coef. P>z Unemployment Coef. P>z
Ec. Position .0587421 0.000 Ec.position .0912601 0.000 Ec.position .1483021 0.000
Sex -.0496454 0.000 Sex -.057121 0.000 Sex -.0686748 0.000
Ideology -.0393462 0.309 Ideology -.0556209 0.125 Ideology .0911756 0.048
Ideology 
(sq.root) .4243437 0.000
Ideology
(sq.root) .4644193 0.000
Ideology
(sq.root) .2427765 0.073
_cons .7448628 0.000 _cons .7104322 0.000 _cons 1.673572 0.000
Random part:
Healthcare Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Var(ideology) .0044981 .0019913 .0018889 .0107115
Var(_cons) .0486531 .0208856 .0209754 .1128524
Cov(ideology,_cons) .0127005 .0059709 .0009978 .0244033
Var(Residual) .3040965 .0037365 .2968605 .3115089
Old-age pensions Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Var(ideology) .0026401 .0012018 .0010818 .0064432
Var(_cons) .0446966 .0191945 .0192635 .1037083
Cov(ideology,_cons) .0085026 .0042711 .0001315 .0168738
Var(Residual) .3011639 .0036969 .2940045 .3084976
Unemployment Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Var(ideology) .0030716 .0014416 .0012242 .0077068
Var(_cons) .0770112 .0330658 .0331955 .1786604
Cov(ideology,_cons) .0095623 .0056922 -.0015942 .0207187
Var(Residual) .5075852 .0063177 .4953526 .5201198
For the 3 models: Prob >chi2 = 0.0000; Lrtest comparing with OLS regression: Pr > chi2 = 0.0000.
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attitudinal differences between egalitarians and individualists regarding welfare programs 
are small, the programs tend to achieve the highest levels of popular support. The above 
conclusion holds true for healthcare and pensions (the coef?cients are statistically signi-
?cant thus indicating a clear relationship) but not for unemployment (the coef?cients are 
positive but not statistically signi?cant) 6. 
 As in the previous section, graph 5 on healthcare presents these ?ndings visually. 
Graphs A3 and A4 on pensions and unemployment can be found in Appendix 2. 
 On the horizontal axis, we ?nd answers to the question used as an indicator of ega-
litarian/individualistic values, while on the vertical axis we ?nd answers to the question 
on state intervention in healthcare. The blue line shows variation in support for state 
intervention in healthcare as we move from more egalitarian to more individualistic 
citizens. 
 The analyses presented in this section point out that the two hypotheses concer-
ning the mechanisms that lead to high legitimacy are upheld by the data.  However, the 
second hypothesis, addressing the need for cross-ideology coalitions to achieve high 
legitimacy is much clearer. In summary, we know that welfare programs with high popular 
support have achieved such support in two ways: 
? They have managed to gain high levels of support from all income groups while 
also reducing the gap between attitudes of low and high income groups. However,  it is 
more important to have a high baseline level of support across all income groups than to 
reduce the attitudinal gap between the rich and the poor. 
? They have managed to obtain substantial support from people whose values are 
not especially close to WS objectives (people that reject redistribution). Welfare pro-
grams with high legitimacy have managed to diminish the attitudinal gap between egalita-
rian and individualistic people, ultimately increasing the support of individualists to levels 
closer to those typical of egalitarians.
WHAT CHARACTERISTICS OF WELFARE PROGRAMS CORRELATE WITH HIGH LEGITIMACY?
The ?nal step of our analysis is to determine which characteristics of welfare programs 
correlate with high legitimacy. Our third hypothesis assumes that integration is crucial in 
activating the mechanisms that lead to high legitimacy. In order to test this last hypothe-
sis, we must change the unit of analysis from the individual to the welfare program and 
quantify the legitimizing effect of attributes of the different programs. 
 To do so, three aspects of the programs and two of the whole WS will be tested. The 
program attributes are Integration, Extension and Economic effort devoted to the pro-
 6 Although the model coef?cients are positive, this indicates a negative relationship due to the counter 
intuitive order of response categories for dependent variables. 
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gram, while the welfare system attributes are Cost and Size. The data used as proxies of 
each attribute are detailed in table 1. 
 With a large sample of countries it is possible to run a multilevel model that includes 
the ?ve attributes (or level 2 variables) simultaneously. Since we are working with only 
eleven cases, we had to build a chain of multilevel models. The ?rst model is the “empty” 
model. This is a model without variables that only indicates what proportion of the variation 
in attitudes towards the WS is due to country level. In the ?rst part of the analysis we men-
tioned that a small fraction of international variation in attitudes is due to the fact that the 
variables affecting welfare attitudes are not equally distributed among the eleven societies 
under study. To account for this, all multilevel models include three individual variables as 
controls: ideology, relative economic position, and sex. In this way, they inform us about the 
effect of each program characteristic on legitimacy after controlling for the fact that some 
countries have more egalitarians or poor people than other countries.
Graph 5. 
Attitudes towards public healthcare and ideology
 (conditioned by sex and economic position)
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France. 
Source: own elaboration with ISSP 1996 data.
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a) Characteristics of healthcare programs and legitimacy
The multilevel models for healthcare programs are presented in table 8. From these 
models, we learn that Extension and Integration are the only indicators that statistically 
correlate with legitimacy, the latter being the one that works best. The percentage of GDP 
spent on public health care and the cost and size of the WS have no impact on people’s 
opinions to state intervention in healthcare.
 Integration explains 73% of the country level variation in attitudes towards healthcare 
programs, while the indicator of extension, although strongly correlated, only explains 
40%. Both of these effects, integration and extension, clearly overlap. Graph 6 aids us in 
interpreting the model coef?cients7. 
 7 The graphs in this section do not derive from the ?tted values of the multilevel models, but from simply plot-
ting the legitimacy index of each program (table 5) against its value in the indicator of integration, extension, etc. 
Graph 6.
Integration of public healthcare programs and legitimacy 
*THE: Total Health Expenditure; Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, 
i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France. 
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 In the top left corner of graph 6, we can identify countries whose public healthcare 
programs have the highest levels of popular support. Surprisingly, if we look at Table 
5, we can see that these countries do not belong to the same welfare regime, cultural 
tradition, or geographical area, but we can now con?rm that all of them have highly inte-
grative healthcare programs. This aids in explaining the common characteristics we ?nd 
regarding attitudes towards healthcare among the citizens of these countries. Graph A5 
in Appendix 2 plots the legitimacy of healthcare programs and its extension.
b) Characteristics of public pension programs and legitimacy
To evaluate the characteristics of public pension programs that shape citizens opinions, 
we build a new set of multilevel models (table 9). The models inform us that the legi-
timacy of old-age public programs does not depend on the cost of the WS for the tax-
payer, the percentage of GDP a country spends on old-age protection, or the size of 
the complete WS. Only the indicator used to measure the extension of the program 
(expenditure on “other services to old-age”) shows a signi?cant relationship with aggre-
gate support. However, when we plot this relationship, we are able to ascertain that 
two countries, Sweden and Norway, spend signi?cantly more on this concept than the 
other countries. The relationship between extension of old-age pension programs and 
legitimacy is completely conditioned by these two cases. 
 None of the pension system characteristics included in the model have a clear 
enough relationship with legitimacy to be statistically signi?cant. While the relationship 
may not be generalisable, plotting replacement rates against legitimacy provides us 
with some interesting information (graphs A6, A7 and A8 in Appendix 2). Apparently, 
having elevated replacement rates for low income groups has no impact on the over-
all legitimacy of public pension systems, while having high replacement rates for high 
income groups increases legitimacy. This result is logical since high income groups are 
more likely to exit the system to acquire private pensions unless high replacement rates 
guarantee them a level of income during old-age similar to the income level they were 
accustomed to while working. 
c) Characteristics of unemployment protection programs and legitimacy
Similar  to what occurred in the cases of healthcare and old-age pensions, legitimacy 
of unemployment policies does not depend on the economic effort the country makes 
towards protecting the unemployed. Even if we weight expenditure on this program by 
the percentage of unemployed in each country, the relationship is not signi?cant. The 
amount of taxes and contributions paid by different income groups also has no impact 
on legitimacy, nor does the size of the complete welfare system. 
 Consistent with results on healthcare programs, the indicators that do correlate 
with popular support are those that act as proxies for the extension and integration of 
unemployment protection systems. Expenditure on active labor market policies (our 
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proxy for extension) and replacement rates of unemployment bene?ts (our proxy for 
integration) show a statistically signi?cant relationship with the legitimacy achieved by 
state intervention in this area. As table 10 shows, expenditure on active labor market 
policies explains 65% of international variance, while replacement rate explains 59% of 
this variance (remember that we are speaking only about the portion of variance due to 
people living in different countries). These effects are inter-related and we would need 
to include both variables simultaneously in our models to understand how they really 
work. But with eleven cases, this is pushing our models a bit too far. What we can say is 
that unemployment public policies that give unemployed people both training and high 
replacement rates, present higher levels of popular support than those with opposing 
characteristics. Graphs plotting the legitimacy of unemployment protection versus 
their degree of integration and extension can be found in Appendix (graphs A9 and 
A10). 
CONCLUSIONS
From the data and analyses presented here, we can conclude that welfare programs 
that achieve the highest legitimacy are those that cover a wide range of needs within its 
domain and are characterized by high integration. 
 This ?nding is independent of the welfare regime, geographical location, and cultural 
area of the country. We locate welfare programs with high legitimacy in each of the four 
welfare regimes in the Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon or Mediterranean areas. What 
these programs have in common is a high level of integration and extension. Interestin-
gly, neither the cost nor the size of the WS appear to in?uence people’s opinions on the 
separate programs that make up the system. The lack of in?uence of the size and cost 
of the WS indicates that each welfare program depends entirely on itself for generating a 
strong and stable basis of support.
 Our analyses support the existence of two mechanisms that link the attributes of a 
program with the opinions that citizens have towards them. Welfare programs characte-
rized by high levels of extension and integration achieve high levels of popular support 
because: 
? They raise the support levels of all income groups. We can assume that middle and 
upper-middle income groups support integrative programs more than others because 
they can bene?t from them. These integrative programs are also favored by low income 
groups probably due to the fact that they offer the highest quality bene?ts, while lacking 
the stigmas typically associated with such programs.  
? They increase the support of citizens who oppose economic redistribution. We can 
hypothesize that when a welfare program integrates all of the population among its bene-
?ciaries, it loses its ideological component in the eye of many citizens and begins to be 
viewed as just another functional social institution. 
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 Walter Korpi (2000) has clearly demonstrated that integrative programs are more 
redistributive than means-tested ones. In light of our results, the higher redistributive 
power of integrative programs is not perceived by people who oppose redistribution. The 
mismatch between reality and popular perceptions appears to be, for once, positive to 
the WS. 
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STATISTICAL DATA. APPENDIX
Graph A1. 
Attitudes towards public pensions and relative economic position 
(conditioned by sex and ideology)
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Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France.
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Graph A2. 
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relative economic position (conditioned by sex and ideology)
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain: United States,  i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, s: Sweden, 
cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France. 
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Graph A3. 
Attitudes towards public pensions and ideology 
(conditioned by sex and economic position) 
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Graphs by country
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France.
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Graph A4. 
Attitudes towards unemployment protection systems and 
ideology (conditioned by sex and economic position) 
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France.
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Graph A5. 
Extension of the public healthcare program and legitimacy
*THE: Total Health Expenditure; Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, 
i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France. 
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Graph A6. 
Replacement rate of public pensions and legitimacy. 
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Graph A7. 
Replacement rate of public pensions and legitimacy. 
Rates for incomes on the national average
Graph A8. 
Replacement rate of public pensions and legitimacy. 
Rate for incomes of twice the national mean
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States, i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France.
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Graph A10.
Extension of unemployment protection and legitimacy
Aus: Australia, d-w: Germany (West), gb: Great Britain, usa: United States,  i: Italy, irl: Ireland, n: Norway, 
s: Sweden, cdn: Canada, e: Spain, f: France.
Graph A9.
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